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BY CIA

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AUTHORITY ISCAP Appeal 2010-009, # 23
BY dae NARA, DATE 11/1/13

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

This is a report of our second series of discussions with [redacted]. The only other copy of this report outside the Agency has been sent to the Attorney General.

Dick
Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

22 September 1970
(DATE)

101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)



21 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with [redacted]
[redacted]

1. Following up on the 14 September 1970 discussions with CIA Director Richard Helms, [redacted] for further discussions of military, political and economic factors affecting the present situation in Chile. Accompanying [redacted] to Washington [redacted] was [redacted]. [redacted] Although [redacted] took part in [redacted] had with Attorney General Mitchell, Dr. Kissinger, [redacted] preferred not to participate in our subsequent discussions with [redacted] noting that [redacted] should probably stay out of such talks at this point.

Further Thoughts on the Military

2. [redacted] extended his previous comments on key Chilean military in the context of their possible actions to avert the inauguration of Marxist Salvador Allende as President of Chile on 4 November. (Allende's slim plurality in the 4 September election must be submitted to a congressional vote on 24 October and he needs to add about 20 votes to those he has to be the constitutional president-elect.) His remarks included the following:

a) Major General Camilo Valenzuela Godoy, Commander of the Santiago Garrison and as such nominal commander of all Army forces in the Santiago area. He commands no troops except in a state of emergency. (COMMENT: As Commander of the Santiago Garrison, Valenzuela commands about 30 men. During a state of emergency he assumes nominal command of all Armed Forces in the Santiago area including the carabineros, or National Police.

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AUTHORITY ISCAP appeal 2010-009 #24

BY dal NARA, DATE 1/7/12

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During the recent presidential election, Valenzuela was appointed temporary military governor (jefe de plaza) of the Santiago area, specifically because he commanded no troops and would not be able to stage unilateral military action; he would have to issue commands through other generals. It is not necessarily the case that Valenzuela would be appointed jefe de plaza if a state of emergency were declared.)

b) Brig. General Orlando Urbina Herrera, Commander of the Second Division, the largest Army unit, is stationed in Santiago and is Valenzuela's most important subordinate. [] characterizes him as a top-notch troop commander, superior in capacity and intelligence to Valenzuela. His cooperation and that of his division would be vital to any military move but his political attitudes are not clear. (A well-informed clandestine source has reported that Urbina [] would respond to orders from Army Commander Rene Schneider rather than Valenzuela if the two issue conflicting instructions.)

c) General Rene Schneider Chereau, Commander in Chief of the Army: [] said very little about this officer except to indicate that he did not believe Schneider would take any part in possible action against Allende's assumption of the presidency and that if he were named Minister of Defense, as has been rumored, it would be a "real mess."

d) Brig. General Enrique Garin Cea, Commander of Military Schools, (a separate and important command in the Chilean Army which includes the Non-commissioned Officers' School, the Special Forces School, the Military Academy, the War Academy, and other concentrations of elite military personnel in training, most of them located in Santiago.) [] did not characterize Garin except to indicate that he considers his cooperation, along with that of Urbina, to be vital in any military action.

e) Major General Carlos Prats Gonzalez, Chief of the National Defense Staff and second in importance in the Army only to Schneider: As an officer assigned to the National Defense Staff, Prats actually has no position in the chain of command of the Army. [] singled out Prats as the most important figure in any military action which might be taken. He described Prats as cagey, cautious, calculating, highly ambitious and very able. He is well-regarded by nearly all Army officers and possesses the qualities which other officers lack to become a rallying

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point for action. Like others who speak highly of Prats, however, [redacted] appeared to have no clear idea of this general's political attitudes and to feel that this was because Prats does not want them known.

f) Brig. General Roberto Viaux Marambio, involuntarily retired after he led the uprising of an Army unit in October 1969 to protest poor pay and equipment. Although Viaux' ambitions and erratic statements have diminished his support somewhat, [redacted] believes that Viaux' strong demagogic appeal and his influence among the NCO's probably offsets the infiltration of leftist influence in the strategic NCO school in Santiago. The key question is whether Viaux would settle for no more than a role as a member of a team taking military action when his strong predilection is to lead. (COMMENT: Viaux on 17 September made a significant public statement, saying that he was not a Marxist, that liberty was not negotiable, and expressing his solidarity with the high command of the Army.) [redacted] was in touch with Valenzuela through a common close friend during the recent presidential campaign. He considers Valenzuela honest but not inclined to take tough or unpopular postures, and not always well informed about his subordinates. He is not believed to have well-organized contingency plans for any action against Allende. Valenzuela has over 30 years of Army service and is greatly interested in assurances that his imminent retirement will include guarantees that he and his family will be well cared for. Of particular importance, [redacted] pointed out, is the longstanding enmity between Viaux and Prats, who would be the two key figures in rallying military action. This enmity of many years was complicated at the time of the uprising a year ago, since Viaux confided his unease over conditions in the Army and the need for the government and high command to do something to overcome them only to Prats. The latter did not pass them along or indicate support of the needs of Army troops as Viaux had hoped.

g) [redacted] in the industrial and mining area centered around Concepcion, Chile's second largest and a heavily leftist city. [redacted] said that [redacted] believes that he could "hold out" with the help he knows he would receive from [redacted] but [redacted] expressed doubt that this was so since armed students and labor leftists are numerous in Concepcion.

2. [] reiterated his belief that the national police, the largest and probably the best trained and best armed uniformed force in Chile, would certainly join in any move against Allende. They have been under intense pressure from extreme leftists without being given the go ahead to deal strongly with them. Carabinero commander General Vicente Huerta Celis could count on his troops for support and probably on most of his officers as well, if they were assured that he would retire and open up promotion possibilities. Huerta and General Valenzuela get along well and share many similar views.

3. [] repeated his belief that President Frei will not act to set off military action to prevent an Allende government and said he felt the President might even welcome being faced with the accomplished fact of a military takeover and relieved at being whisked out of the country.

4. [] warned that the armed forces' leaders are unlikely to take action without several clear and specific guarantees, primarily from the United States, because they are fearful that they and their families would pay a high price if they were to act and not receive immediate decisive and substantial assistance. These guarantees would have to include:

a) immediate logistical support consisting of arms, ammunition, transportation, communications equipment, and fuel;

b) immediate and possibly massive economic support from outside;

c) assurances that they would not be abandoned and ostracized by the same powerful U.S. critics who denounce the military government of Greece;

5. [] believes too that the Chilean military leaders would want strong assurances of support from Chilean civilians and indications from political leaders that action by the military mirrors civilian attitudes.

6. [] said that no Chilean, military or civilian, would consider the offer of [] military backing a motivating factor to move against the prospect of a Marxist government. If it were offered, such backing might have exactly the opposite effect.

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EYES ONLY

